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FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1354
INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 002202

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/E AND ACTING A/S CARTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2019

TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [PTER](#) [MOPS](#) [SO](#)

SUBJECT: SOMALIA - KISMAYO SITUATION MARKED BY COMPLEX
INTERESTS AND FRACTURING AL-SHABAAB

REF: A. NAIROBI 2149

[B](#). NAIROBI 2141

[C](#). NAIROBI 2132

Classified By: Somalia Unit Deputy Joe Trimble for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

[1](#). (C) Summary: As of October 19 the situation in Lower Juba was marked by an increasingly complex mosaic of interests and a fractious al-Shabaab, reportedly divided over whether to cooperate with the Darod/Marehan subclan in order to hold Kismayo. (Note: The Marehan subclan represents a small minority in Lower Juba and some Marehan appear to be tactically working with al-Shabaab in order to retain some influence in Kismayo. End note.) Our contacts tell us al-Shabaab on October 18 pulled most of its militia into Kismayo due to rain and deteriorating road conditions and announced a new administration for the port town that included a new alliance with some Marehan clansmen. However, on October 19 one al-Shabaab faction reportedly assassinated a key Marehan figure in the new administration when al-Shabaab leaders disagreed over whether the group should concern itself with local subclan interests. Meanwhile, Juba Resistance Chairman Mohamed Amin on October 18 told us he was en route to the Somali border to organize additional forces inside of Juba to reinforce Ahmed Madobe and the Darod/Kabalah clan alliance currently fighting al-Shabaab for dominance in Lower Juba. TFG Minister for State Hidig told us he does not trust Madobe and was putting together his own force from within Lower Juba to move on Kismayo. Northeast Kenya contacts continue to allege the Government of Kenya and/or Somali officials are attempting to recruit Kenyan Somalis and Somali refugees in northeast Kenya to fight in Lower Juba (ref a). While Madobe's efforts to purge al-Shabaab in Kismayo may not lead to success, we think a TFG-Kenyan push that does not include Madobe's alliance would almost certainly fail. Moreover, attempts by TFG representatives or other parties to utilize militia from outside Lower Juba or lesser militia in the region in an effort to take Kismayo would most likely lead to intra-Darod conflict, distracting all parties from the fight against al-Shabaab. End Summary.

[2](#). (C) Our contacts tell us al-Shabaab on 18 October pulled most of its militia into Kismayo due to rain and announced a new administration for the port town that included a new alliance with some Marehan clansmen in the port town. However, on October 19 al-Shabaab militia from one faction of the group reportedly assassinated a key Marehan figure in the new administration when al-Shabaab leaders disagreed over whether al-Shabaab should concern itself with local subclan interests. Multiple contacts in Lower Juba tell us some

Marehan in Kismayo have formed a tactical alliance with al-Shabaab in order to retain some influence in the region. However, the alliance between opportunistic Marehan leaders and al-Shabaab was strained on October 19 when an al-Shabaab faction assassinated prominent Marehan businessman Daud Dirir who had made a deal with al-Shabaab over port revenues.

(Note: al-Shabaab has since late September been engaged in fighting Ras Kamboni militia, the Anole faction, and other Darod/Kabalah clan militia in and around the port town of Kismayo. (ref a). Madobe's alliance, after moving into much of Kismayo in late September, almost immediately retreated to positions outside of the town. Since then fighting has occurred mostly outside of the town. Al-Shabaab on October 7 suffered losses of personnel and supply trucks when they were overwhelmed by Madobe's alliance in a town outside Kismayo. End note.)

13. (C) Meanwhile, TFG MP and Juba Resistance Chairman Mohammed Amin on October 18 told us he was en route to Juba to organize additional forces inside of Juba to reinforce Ahmed Madobe and the Darod/Kabalah clan alliance. A contact close to Madobe told us Madobe's alliance had acquired construction equipment from local businessmen that would allow them to better navigate the roads and were encouraged that the al-Shabaab's vehicles were bogged down by the rains. (Note: The contact did not specify the number or exact type of equipment. End Note.) TFG Minister for State Hidig told us he does not trust Madobe and was putting together his own force from within Lower Juba to move on Kismayo. (Note: Hidig is from the Darod/Kabalah/Absame/Ogaden clan but is reportedly a close associate of General Morgan and Barre Hirale, figures who in recent months have attempted to work

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against the emergence of a Darod/Kabalah alliance in Lower Juba. End note.). Other members of the TFG have for months been in tenuous discussions with Madobe (ref c). And, Northeast Kenya contacts continue to allege the GOK and/or Somali officials are attempting to recruit enyan Somalis and Somali refugees in northeast Kenya to fight in Lower Juba. (ref b).

14. (C) Comment: While Madobe's efforts to purge al-Shabaab in Kismayo may not lead to success, we think a push that does not include Madobe's alliance would almost certainly fail. Moreover, attempts by some TFG representatives or other parties to utilize militia from outside Lower Juba or lesser militia in the region in an effort to take Kismayo would most likely lead to intra-Darod conflict, distracting all parties from the fight against al-Shabaab.

RANNEBERGER